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the proof of service was not filed until after this extension,
47 the
statute of limitations had barred the plaintiff's cause of action.
The court, in ruling against the defendant's contention, had to
interpret the meaning of CPLR 308(3) in light of CPLR 203
which is the statutory provision dealing with the running of the
statute of limitations. CPLR 203 (a) computes the time in which an
action must be commenced from the time the cause of action
accrues to the time the claim is interposed. A claim, according to
CPLR 203(b) (1) is interposed when the summons is served upon
the defendant. The court was of the opinion "that the 'completion'
of service by filing proof of service does not and was not
intended to determine the date of the interposing of the claim." 4s
The court further stated that "commencement, not completion, of
service is the threshold of interposure of a claim where service
other than delivery to the defendant in person is used." 49
The requirement of filing proof of service was added in order
to follow past practice, and apparently there is no time limitation
placed upon an effective filing.50 The actual purpose of this clause
is to add ten days to a defendant's time to answer when substituted
service is utilized.51 Thus, the fact that filing occurs after the
statute of limitations expires should not give defendant a valid
defense.
This conclusion is reinforced when CPLR 203(b)(2) and
CPLR 316(c) are read together. CPLR 203(b) (2), which concerns service by publication, provides that a claim is interposed
"when first publication of the summons . . . is made," and CPLR
316(c) provides that "service by publication is complete on the
,
twenty-eighth day after the first day of publication."
One authority has argued that since this filing provision exists
merely for the purpose of adding to the time in which the dethis provision would have been better placed
fendant must answer,
52
in CPLR 3012(c).
Vehicle & Traffic Law §254: Applies for reasonable time after
defendant returns to the state after more than thirty-day absence.
5 3
Gallagher v. Price,
adds clarification to Sections 253 and 254
of the Vehicle & Traffic Law, sections frequently used by the
4 CPLR 308(3) provides that when service is effected pursuant to that
section the service is complete ten days after the filing of proof of service in the

county
clerk's office.
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Browning v. Nix, 47 Misc. 2d 709, 710, 263 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (Sup. Ct.
Erie45 County 1965).
Id. at 711, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
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practicing attorney. This is so notwithstanding the "long-arm"
operation of the provisions of CPLR 302. Section 253, in essence,
provides that the operation of a motor vehicle in New York
by a nonresident is equivalent to the appointment of the Secretary
of State as his "true and lawful attorney" upon whom a summons
may be served in a negligence action arising out of such operation.
Section 254 makes the aforementioned provisions of section 253
applicable to a resident who leaves New York subsequent to an
accident and remains continuously absent for thirty days, whether
:.
such absence is temporary or permanent.
The statute of limitations, in the instant case, was due to
expire on August 1, 1964. The defendant, a resident of New York,
departed on April 25, 1964 and returned eleven days prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Service was attempted
under Section 254 of the Vehicle & Traffic Law after the defendant had returned from a three-month absence. The defendant
contended that since he was physically present in New York at
the time of service under section 254, such section did not apply,
and service on the Secretary of State was not effective.
He
reasoned, therefore, that the cause of action was now barred by
the statute of limitations.
The court, in disposing of defendant's contention, stated that
section 254 "extends at least to a reasonable time after the return
of one who has absented himself from the State for more than
30 days."
Section 253 of the Vehicle & Traffic Law, by virtue of section
254 of that statute, is applicable to a resident who,; 'subsequent
to his involvement in an accident, leaves the state for any reason
whatever, thus making personal service of process upon him impracticable if not impossible. As initially enacted, the predecessor
of section 254 applied to any resident who left the state for a
period of more than thirty days.55 A conflict then arose as to
whether the statute applied to resident motorists "whose activities
take them outside the State for temporary periods of more than
thirty days." 6 This was clarified by an addition to the statute
which expressly made it applicable "whether such absence is intended
to be temporary or permanent." 7
Section 254 is intended to insure that- both resident motorists
and nonresidents cannot evade the jurisdiction of the court by
leaving the state. If the defendant in the instant case were to
54 Id. at 389, 262 N.Y.S2d at 645-46.
55 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 54, § 52a, as added by Laws of New York,

1931, ch. 154.
56 1941 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 23, SEvENTH ANNUAL R.FORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CouNcnL 41.
57 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 54, § 52a, as added by Laws of New York,
1941, ch. 248.
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succeed, the direct result sought to be accomplished by the statute
would, be thwarted. The result reached in the instant case is the
only logical one in light of what the statute seeks to insure. To
hold otherwise would compel a plaintiff who desires to effect service
pursuant to section 254 to continually survey a proposed defendant's
residence in order to determine whether or not he had returned
from his more than thirty-day absence.
CPLR 311 and BCL § 307.: Alternate methods of service.
In lieu of employing the provisions of Article 3 of the CPLR,
jurisdiction over foreign corporations may be based upon BCL § 307,
and service of process may be made as therein prescribed. Under
the CPLR, foreign corporations are subject to the jurisdiction of
New York for their business activities if they are "doing business"
here in the traditional sense, s or if they "transact any business"
in this state and are sued with respect to that business.59 In either
case personal service of process must normally be made upon an
officer or agent of the defendant pursuant to CPLR 311. In
comparison, BCL § 307, prior to September 1, 1965, subjected a
foreign corporation to New York's jurisdiction if it was "doing any
business" here and provided that service of process be made upon
the Secretary of State followed by service of process upon an officer
or agent of the defendant either personally or by mailing.
In Railex Corp. v. White Machine Co.,60 decided June 7, 1965,
the plaintiff attempted to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant
foreign corporation by service of process upon the Secretary of State
pursuant to BCL § 307. The court, however, held that no jurisdiction had been obtained because BCL § 307 was applicable only
when the defendant was "doing business" in New York in the
traditional sense. The court found it irrelevant that a basis for
jurisdiction probably existed under the long-arm statute, CPLR
302(a) (1) (transacting any business), since in such event service
should have been made personally upon an officer or an agent
of the defendant pursuant to CPLR 311.61
As of September 1, 1965, however, BCL § 307 has been
amended so as to effect in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation in the New York courts in any case where jurisdiction
would also exist under Article 3 of the CPLR.
53 CPLR 301 allows New York courts to exercise such jurisdiction over
non-domiciliaries as could be exercised prior to the enactment of the
The traditional requirement for jurisdiction over foreign corporations
they be "doing business" in New York. For a clarification of
business," see Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208

439, 260 N.Y.S2d 625 (1965).
59 CPLR 302(a) (1).
60 243 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
61 Id. at 384.
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